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Understanding Social Investment Policy: evidence from the evaluation of 
Futurebuilders in England 
 
Abstract: The concept of social investment has attracted interest from policy makers, 
financial markets and not for profit organisations. It is an emergent notion which is multi-
faceted and includes different market forms, policy responses, and institutional 
configurations. There is relatively little empirical evidence on the design, implementation and 
impacts of the various initiatives which have been perceived as falling within the field of 
social investment. This paper begins to address this gap. It draws on the national evaluation 
of Futurebuilders in England which was undertaken between 2005 and 2010. At the time 
Futurebuilders was one of the largest examples of a public policy initiative to support social 
investment; based on a policy model of government seeking to promote the use of loan 
funding to third sector organisations as part of a wider agenda of expanding the sector's role 
in the delivery of public services. The paper explores the effects of the programme on the 
third sector, on public service delivery and on service users. In conclusion the paper 
challenges some of the assumptions of this policy model, as well as the potential for 'impact 
investing' to become a framework for welfare provision. 
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The emergence of social investment and the policy response  
The concept of social investment has two broad meanings. The first concerns the promotion 
of a 'social investment state', a term coined by Giddens (1998) with a guideline for 
'investment in human capital wherever possible, rather than direct provision of economic 
maintenance. In place of the welfare state we should put the social investment state' 
(Giddens 1998 117, emphasis in original). It is used both as a (normative) guiding principle 
and a pragmatic response to what are seen as contemporary challenges of welfare (Lister 
2005 175), including garnering electoral support for redistribution (Midgley 2001 167). The 
second meaning concerns the provision of funding (and typically non-grant funding such as 
loans) for some form of societal benefit, with an emphasis on expressing such benefits in 
monetary terms as though they were returns on a financial investment (HM Government 
2011). In this sense it has been used by private, public and third sectors. It may therefore 
include 'ethical investment' by institutional investors, the provision of finance by government 
to organisations delivering some form of benefit to society, or as a strategy of charitable 
foundations seeking a new focus for the distribution of grants. As Nicholls (2010 71) 
acknowledges, the 'definitional boundaries of what constitutes the "social" is […] problematic'. 
The concern of this paper is with the second meaning of social investment and broadly, but 
not exclusively, with the promotion by the state of loan funding to third sector organisations. 
Moreover, the paper provides an empirical assessment of investment-like models for funding 
social policies. 
Nicholls (2010) notes that despite growing international policy interest in social investment, 
with the development of a considerable and fast growing grey literature (Bank of England 
2003; HM Government 2011; Carrington 2005; J.P.Morgan 2010; Monitor Institute 2011), it 
has failed to attract much academic analysis or research. Exceptions to this include Nicholls’ 
own work (Nicholls 2009; 2010) which has sought to conceptualise the social investment 
field and better define social entrepreneurship, community finance including institutional 
measures (GHK 2010; Affleck and Mellor 2006; Derban et al 2005; Pollinger et al 2007), the 
financial exclusion of businesses and individuals (Fuller and Mellor 2008), and the 
measurement of social and financial returns (Nicholls 2009; Arvidson et al 2011). Indeed, the 
fluidity and general pace of change around social investment has probably hampered the 
emergence of a body of academic research.   
Nonetheless, since the mid-1990s social investment has become an important component of 
the policy maker's repertoire, ranging from normative guiding principles (Giddens 1998) to 
more pragmatic and instrumental action. This is true of government policy surrounding the 
funding of the third sector where debates have shifted from the primary position of grant-
based models (Carrington 2005) to an emphasis on investment and the wide-ranging set of 
actions required of government, the third sector and private capital to enable such a change 
to take place (Funding Commission 2010; HM Government 2011). Internationally, the newly 
favoured policy has become known as 'impact investment' with an emphasis placed on 
recipient organisations demonstrating 'social returns' to funders, akin to the financial returns 
required in financial investment decisions (J.P.Morgan 2010; O’Donohoe et al 2010).  
Nicholls (2010) highlights the range of investment logics which may be at play, ranging from 
pure social and environmental returns from grants or the emergent phenomenon of venture 
philanthropy (whereby philanthropists and foundations seek to invest money for 'social 
returns' and encourage entrepreneurship by not for profit organisations) through to finance 
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made available on the basis of a full market return. In many cases therefore the social 
investment market landscape concerns the provision of loan funding and as such the 
requirement upon recipients to repay loan capital with some level of interest. The investment 
logic is that loans bring wider benefits both in terms of recycling funds, but also in changing 
the behaviours of loan recipients (HM Government 2011) and their financial capability 
(Funding Commission 2010), including the acceptance of financial risk.  
The social investment policies of governments have tended to focus on addressing what are 
broadly termed issues of under-capitalisation (Haugh and Kitson 2007), and that such under-
capitalisation leads to the third sector not realising its full potential (HM Government 2011).  
However, there appear to be different forms of the social investment policy model. The one 
considered in this paper, Futurebuilders, was an initiative of the previous, New Labour 
government to promote the use of loan funding in third sector organisations, as part of a 
wider strategy of government to increase the role of the third sector in the delivery of public 
services. By contrast the current Coalition Government places less emphasis on state action 
to achieve its wider policy aims and greater emphasis on the development of a social 
investment market that can help bring greater private capital (including from institutional 
investors) into the third sector. Moreover, as Nicholls with Pharoah (2008) show, such action 
by government needs to be seen within a wider landscape of social investment and in 
particular the relationships between the demand-side (including the panoply of different third 
sector organisational forms), the supply-side (including investors, tax payers and 
foundations), and intermediaries (including Futurebuilders, but also such diverse 
organisations as credit unions and stock markets).  
This paper uses research undertaken as part of the national evaluation of Futurebuilders 
(Wells et al 2010) to explore the contribution of social investment to public service delivery, 
to the development of the third sector and to the consequent impacts on wider society and in 
particular in addressing societal problems. The paper is structured as follows, it considers 
the Futurebuilders policy initiative and outlines the main evaluation methods, and then 
considers each policy impact in turn (on third sector organisations, on public service delivery 
and on service users). In the discussion and conclusion the paper returns to the logics for 
government action in the arena of social investment. Three aspects are considered: the 
extent to which social investment provides a blueprint for restructuring welfare provision; 
whether it successfully addresses market failures; and finally the degree to which it changes 
the behaviour of third sector organisations.  
 
Futurebuilders and its evaluation 
Futurebuilders was an initiative of the New Labour government in the UK to promote the use 
of loan funding in the third sector in England. Although not labelled as such, Futurebuilders 
can be seen as one of the largest single interventions by a national government in the field 
of social investment. It can also be seen as informing social investment policies, for instance 
proposals for a social investment market made in 2011 by the UK's Coalition Government 
(HM Government 2011). 
Futurebuilders arose out of the UK Treasury's Cross-Cutting Review of the Role of the 
Voluntary and Community Sector in Service Delivery (HM Treasury 2002).  The review 
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suggested that there was considerable potential for third sector organisations to play a 
bigger role in providing public services.  The third sector was thought to have advantages 
over both the private and public sectors in terms of greater flexibility and responsiveness to 
social problems, trustworthiness, understanding need, community involvement, closeness to 
users, specialist expertise and the contribution of volunteers (Billis and Harris 1996). As such, 
Futurebuilders was emblematic of New Labour government policy making in that it sought to 
expand the mixed economy of welfare within a wider framework of improving the quantity 
and quality of public services. As will be shown, it relied on the joining-up of government 
action: namely expanding the capacity of third sector organisations through Futurebuilders 
went hand-in-hand with opening up public services for delivery by the third sector.  
Futurebuilders was launched by the Home Office in 2004. A total of £215 million was 
allocated to the programme by government. In January 2010 Futurebuilders made its final 
investment. At this point 375 organisations had agreed investments worth a total of £154.7 
million, of which the total value of loan investment was £126.5 million (the remainder being in 
grants) (Wells et al 2010). Investments were made to organisations working in five broad 
fields of public service delivery (health and social care, education and learning, children and 
young people, crime and community cohesion). By the end of January 2010, £91.4 million 
had been disbursed with the remainder of organisations with loan agreements still to draw 
down funding. Loan investments ranged in size from £20,000 to £6 million. Loans were 
made to both working and physical capital activities although the latter were more significant 
(93 per cent of loans by value were in physical capital). Reflecting this, the average 
repayment period for loan recipients was 13 years, with some loans being for a period of 27 
years. Many organisations agreeing loans were clearly entering into long-term agreements.i  
The evaluation of Futurebuilders was commissioned in May 2005 and the final report 
published in March 2010 (Wells et al 2010). Futurebuilders was a complex and multi-faceted 
programme designed around a relatively simple hypothesis: Futurebuilders increases the 
capacity of the voluntary and community sector to deliver public services. Figure 1 provides 
a theory of change or rationale for Futurebuilders and was used to guide the evaluation. 
Futurebuilders was not a grant programme nor sought to replicate the role of commercial 
investment. It was intended to intervene by providing a mix of funding (loan, grants and 
advice) provided in a patient and engaged way over a long time to increase the capacity of 
third sector organisations to deliver public services.  
Figure 1: Futurebuilders Evaluation Strands and Logic Chain 
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Source: Wells, P. et al (2010), Evaluation of Futurebuilders 
The following features of Futurebuilders are worth highlighting:  
 it was established through government contracting with an independent fund 
manager (Futurebuilders England Ltd)  the fund manager established an investment model to deliver this contract (i.e. to 
market the Fund, attract and appraise applications, and then invest, support and 
monitor organisations)  support was provided to develop organisations' delivery of services (notably 
organisational development and procurement)  Futurebuilders was intended to lead to three sets of outcomes in terms of 
organisational development, public service delivery and improved outcomes for 
service users 
The evaluation focused on what may be seen as the three main outcome areas for 
Futurebuilders: on the third sector organisations in receipt of loans; changes in public service 
delivery; and changes for service users. These are the three categories used for the 
presentation of the main empirical findings in this paper. Although a variety of quantitative 
and qualitative research methods were used in the evaluation, this paper draws primarily on 
case studies of investee organisations. These are complemented with the analysis of 
monitoring data held by Futurebuilders and interviews with Futurebuilders' staff. Further 
information on the methodology is contained elsewhere (see Wells et al 2010).  
Seventeen investee organisations were used as case studies during the evaluation. Case 
organisations were selected to provide a balance across three criteria: public service 
delivery area; size of investment; and size of organisation. Case studies were formally 
anonymised using identifier letters A-Q and a simple descriptive label for the purpose of the 
organisation or investment project. Each case and its identifier are outlined in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Case Study Organisations 
Case 
Code Activity 
Public 
Service 
Delivery 
Area 
Investment 
Size Band2 
Turnover 
Band3 
Case 
Study 
Wave4 
A Work-based support provided to ex-
offenders 
Crime Small Large 1 & 2 
B Stabilisation of drug-users Crime Medium Large 1 
C Support to refugees Education Small Medium 1 
D Support to children with a lifelong limiting 
condition 
Education Large Large 1 & 2 
 7 
Case 
Code Activity 
Public 
Service 
Delivery 
Area 
Investment 
Size Band2 
Turnover 
Band3 
Case 
Study 
Wave4 
E Mental health support  Health Small Medium 1 
F Sheltered accommodation and support for 
older people 
Health Medium Medium 1 & 2 
G Children’s day care centre Young 
People 
Small Small 1 & 2 
H Community cohesion projects Cohesion Medium Medium 1 
I Health and social care project supporting 
sex workers and their families 
Health Small Medium 1 
J Support facility for people with learning 
disabilities 
Health Medium Large 1 & 2 
K Housing focused community reconciliation 
project 
Cohesion Medium Medium 1 
L Education and inclusion through the arts for 
disadvantaged people 
Education Large Medium 1 
M Prison-based education programmes Crime Medium Medium 1 & 2 
N Counselling for young people Children Medium Small 1 & 2 
O 
 
Support for people with physical and 
sensory disabilities 
Health Medium Medium 2 
P 
 
Community development and inclusion for 
hard to reach communities 
Cohesion Medium Large 2 
Q 
 
Social care accommodation  for people with 
complex needs 
Health Major Large 2 
Notes: Public Service delivery areas expressed in full are: Crime; Education and Learning; Health and 
Social Care; Children and Young People; and Community Cohesion 
2
 Size bands for Investments are: Small – up to £250,000; Medium - £250,000 to £1 million; Large – £1 
million to £10 million; Major - Over £10 million 
3
 Size bands for Turnover at the point of investment are: Small – up to £100,000 ; Medium - £100,000 to 
£1 million; Large – over £1 million) 
4
 Wave 1 case study fieldwork took place in 2006/7; wave 2 in 2009 
 
Of these 17, eight case studies were longitudinal with fieldwork undertaken at two or more 
time points with at least a year between site visits. It was also possible to draw on quite 
detailed records held by Futurebuilders, including quantitative monitoring information and 
notes from site visits by staff. 
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Case studies gathered data about the processes of securing and managing the investment, 
the organisational effects of the investment, particularly where the investment plan was to 
significantly grow and transform the organisation, and third sector relationships with funders. 
A case study workbook was used to combine the various types of data collected; a brief 
overview of the workbook provided in Table 2.  
Table 2: Outline Structure of the Case Study Workbook  
Heading Outline Content 
Organisational Characteristics Numbers of staff and volunteers; history 
of organisation; legal status; income and 
expenditure 
Futurebuilders Processes Details of the interaction with 
Futurebuilders England Ltd including 
details of application process, contractual 
processes, investment monitoring, and 
additional support needs and whether 
these were met, and resolution of 
problems 
Inputs Details of all inputs into the project the 
investment was funding, including other 
external financial support, non-financial 
assistance, and the organisation's own 
resources 
Organisational capacity Assessment against a set of internal 
factors (including governance, 
management practices, human 
resources, financial management and 
service delivery and user involvement) 
and external factors (relations with 
stakeholders and funders) 
Mapping and measuring of outputs Measuring where possible the direct 
benefits of the investment (for instance, 
the increase in capacity) 
Mapping and measuring of outcomes Measuring the results of the outputs in 
terms of benefits to service users, the 
organisation itself and the contribution to 
various government targets for public 
service delivery 
 
Further steps taken to ensure the validity and reliability of the data included: the keeping of 
field notes by case study researchers; ensuring that a range of staff (senior officers and 
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frontline) as well as trustees were interviewed; conducting interviews with representatives of 
external organisations (typically the funders of the case organisations); collection and 
analysis of documentary evidence (such as contracts, local strategy documents, and where 
available locally commissioned evaluations); and monitoring data (including both output and 
outcome information if available). Qualitative material collected through the case study 
workbook was analysed using NVIVO and quantitative data analysed in spreadsheets. The 
case study research team met throughout the evaluation, for instance for briefings in the use 
of the workbook, recording and writing up of findings, and analysis of findings.  
 
Data collection included interviews with senior officers within the case studies (directors and 
chief executives), board members and trustees, staff members concerned with the delivery 
of investment related projects, and external funders and stakeholders (for instance 
representatives from local authorities). The data collected also included investment and 
project documentation (for instance business plans and cash flow forecasts) and, importantly, 
locally held monitoring data on service users. In addition, Futurebuilders collected and made 
available a huge array of administrative and monitoring data. This included simple 
descriptive material about applicants and investees (e.g. organisational size and service 
area, numbers and size of contracts won) but also judgements presented in a common 
format about investee performance, notably around the risk of investments.   
As indicated, Futurebuilders did not lend itself to a simple evaluation design. It was a 
complex programme that changed over time and involved relatively small numbers of 
investee organisations. Moreover, as investments made took time to have an effect, the 
focus needed to be on earlier investments and to some extent forecasts were needed as to 
the likelihood of eventual progress. These evaluation issues are well understood and are 
probably increasingly common in policy evaluation, as reflected in the evaluation literature 
on complexity (Sanderson 2006) and calls for more theory based and realist approaches 
(Pawson 2006). These issues are significant given the increasing interest of policy makers in 
social investment and the high profile given to social impact investing. The following sections 
outline the main research findings.  
 
Change for Organisations  
The case study research explored change for organisations primarily through examining how 
their organisational capacity changed as a result of the investment. Aspects of organisational 
capacity considered included (organisational) governance, management practice, human 
resources, user involvement, financial management, service delivery and external relations 
(typically with funders). Data was collected to common prompts in the case study workbook, 
from interviews with the case study organisation, with the officer in Futurebuilders 
responsible for the investment, and from documentation held by Futurebuilders and the case 
study organisation. Interviewees were required to be reflective (for instance in considering 
management capacity or relations with funders).  
The 17 case study organisations fell into two broad groups: a set of eight large organisations 
(with annual incomes over £1 million) which had mainly built capacity prior to the investment, 
and a set of nine smaller organisations (with annual incomes of less than £1 million, 
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including one with an income of less than £100,000) seeking to grow significantly based on 
the investment and which needed to develop organisational capacity (in the fields indicated 
in Table 1).   
In the group of eight having built capacity prior to the investment, the effect of the investment 
was limited in terms of organisational development. The focus for these organisations was 
very much on the expansion of their operations, typically by the construction of an additional 
building through which to provide services. Only small developments were required to 
organisational capacity. These more narrow needs were recognised by Futurebuilders and in 
most cases some additional support provided (including grant based support).  
However, these organisations were not immune to experiencing falls in capacity, typically as 
a result of a funding crisis. In one case in particular, shifts in public policy and in this case 
the delayed roll out of the National Offender Management System,ii greatly reduced 
anticipated funding opportunities. As a result, a relatively stable and well-developed 
organisation went through two rounds of staffing reduction and a rationalisation of activities, 
alongside having to draw on surpluses from its other operations to repay the loan funding.  
The second group of nine organisations had limited organisational capacity at the point of 
investment, and a key component of investment support (using grants far more than the first 
group) was to develop and grow the organisation. In seven of nine cases the investment 
package included the following support: 
 organisational restructuring (six cases)  financial management (five cases)  staff expansion and management (four cases)  diversifying the organisations' income base (three cases)  the role of governance and board composition (three cases)  acquisition of improved or new premises (two cases)  expansion of services into other local authority areas (two cases)  systematic monitoring and evaluation systems (two cases)  marketing strategies (one case)  implementation of quality frameworks (one case)  reconfiguration of services (one case). 
 
Of the other two cases, one organisation lost a key funding source just after the investment 
decision and went into financial crisis which nearly resulted in its closure, and in the other a 
proposal to build a children's daycare centre and nursery became subject to extended 
planning permission problems, resulting in the organisation not developing the investment 
project in the period of the evaluation.  
Of the seven cases of smaller organisations, support to build organisational capacity was 
largely successful. Nonetheless three of these organisations struggled as a result of the 
unexpected loss of key staff members. However, at the final visits to these organisations all 
were showing early signs of regaining stability (both in organisational and financial terms) 
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and the potential to realise the aims of the investment to increase their capacity to deliver 
services. This helped highlight the benefits and role of a funding relationship that was 
engaged, supportive, and over a relatively long time.  
These findings can be set in the context of an analysis undertaken by Futurebuilders of the 
annual reviews of 100 investments (largely, of the first 100 investments made) which 
included an assessment of organisational development. The annual review process involved 
a risk assessment in which investees were graded (green, amber or red) according to a 
series of criteria linked to the progress of their investment. A green rating indicated no 
concerns, amber some concerns needing further monitoring, and red indicating a 
requirement for further support and an investment at risk. The annual review included an 
assessment of the organisation (how well run it is, such as its management and governance, 
and its financial viability) and of its investment proposal (the success of its delivery to date 
and whether it remains financially viable). An overview of this data from Annual Reviews 
carried out during 2009 is provided in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: On Overview of Futurebuilders England Annual Review Data 2009 
Criteria 
 
Green Amber Red 
Organisation: How well run? 86% 9% 5% 
Financially viable? 40% 39% 21% 
Proposal: Successful delivery? 72% 22% 4% 
Financially viable? 44% 44% 12% 
Source: FBE Annual Review Data, December 2009 
This suggests that the organisational development status of most investees is generally 
positive - across each of the four criteria more than three-quarters of investees are graded 
green or amber. However, there was concern about the financial viability of one in five 
investees. It is to be expected that capacity building support  (such as advice either provided 
by FBE Ltd staff or contracted consultants) would be focused on these organisations and 
there is some evidence that this was the case - of the 21 investees graded red for financial 
viability, 12 had received some form of additional grant. It should be noted that, despite 
concerns about financial viability, relatively few investees (four per cent) were graded red for 
the delivery of the proposal, suggesting that for most organisations investments remained on 
track at the time of the assessment.  
The organisational development status of investee organisations can be explored in more 
detail by considering the distribution of 'red' grades by organisation size (see Table 4). 
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Table 4: Futurebuilders England Annual Review Data 2009 - red grades by 
organisational size  
Criteria 
 
Small Medium Large 
Organisation: How well run? 6% 8% 0% 
Financially viable? 38% 25% 7% 
Proposal: Successful delivery? 0% 6% 3% 
Financially viable? 13% 15% 7% 
Source: FBE Annual Review Data, December 2009 
Table 4 reveals that small and medium sized organisations (with a turnover of less than £1 
million) are considerably more likely to be graded red for financial viability than large 
organisations, echoing the case study findings.   
A role of social investment is not just the provision of finance but also engaged support, as 
reflects the wider literature on the exclusion of individuals and organisations from loan 
finance; for instance as Stiglitz (1990) shows there are risks of bad debts because borrowers 
know more about their circumstances and therefore risks to the debt than lenders (what is 
referred to as asymmetric information). The case studies and monitoring information showed 
that Futurebuilders was identifying the more vulnerable organisations and providing greater 
support for these, through grants and business support. However, and this is the critical 
issue for social investment policy, the support provided was not a guarantee of success, 
although the case study evidence suggests that loan finance with other support had 
improved organisational development practices. This issue is returned to in the conclusion. 
 
Change for Public Service Delivery 
Futurebuilders had a very clear remit to expand the public service delivery capacity of third 
sector organisations. Social investment programmes supported by government in the future 
are likely to have similar goals, as part of a wider marketisation of public service delivery 
(Alcock 2010), as the promotion of a mixed economy of welfare, or for the ideological 
preference for supporting not for profit and community controlled organisations over state 
provision.  Futurebuilders made its first investments in 2004 and final investment at the 
beginning of 2010. The majority of investments were in physical capital. Increases in public 
service delivery capacity may take considerable time to be realised. This section draws on 
two main sets of data, an analysis of monitoring data about the public service contracts 
secured by investees and the experiences of the 17 case study organisations.  
Data on public sector contracts secured was collected by Futurebuilders over an 18 month 
period from April 2008 to September 2009. In this period, 102 investees had secured 454 
public service delivery contracts that were linked in some way to the Futurebuilders 
investment. These contracts were worth approximately £55.5 million. Overall, 43 per cent of 
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full investees (those organisations receiving funding with some element of loan funding) 
were awarded at least one contract with the figure rising to 60 per cent when only those 
organisations drawing down their loans were considered. Although the mean value of 
contracts was £122,000, they ranged from less than £1,000 (11 contracts) to more than £1 
million (nine contracts). The largest contract was for £3.5 million with a local NHS Trust. 
Contract awards were distributed unevenly: exactly 20 per cent of organisations contributed 
80 percent of contracts by value. Large organisations, with turnovers of over £1 million, 
received 46 per cent of contracts by value, and medium-sized organisations 44 per cent. 
Small and start-up organisations received only 10 per cent of contracts by value. Moreover, 
although 47 per cent of the number of contracts were for amounts less than £30,000, 
contracts priced at over £500,000 made up 58 per cent of contracts by value. The implication 
is that it is the larger organisations may be in a preferential position vis-à-vis smaller 
organisations in terms of their market position and therefore loan repayment. A longer series 
of data is required to confirm that this is the case. 
By far the most significant purchaser of services from investees was found to be local 
authorities (52 per cent of the number of contracts and 51 per cent of the value of contracts) 
followed by health organisations (eight per cent by number and 16 per cent by value). The 
significance of local authorities is important given subsequent findings about relations 
between investees and funders. In particular, the case study research revealed that an 
understanding of local context was vital to understanding the variation in performance across 
investees. There were for example: 
 cases that see stakeholder (funder) relations as central to their success and actively 
aim to contribute to shaping the national and local policy landscapes in which they 
operate, and, in some instances, effectively 'create their own markets' (for instance 
an organisation which develops an innovative and therefore market leading service)  cases where policy environments and local commissioners' policies are crucial to the 
organisation's success, but investees are much more passive in relation to changes 
in their environment. These organisations usually approach public service delivery 
through responding to public procurement tenders  cases where organisations are the sole provider of services within a geographic 
locality and therefore occupy a favourable position with local commissioners.  
In any of the above cases, conditions for the success of investments appear to be more 
favourable in situations where there is a close alignment between local agency priorities, 
strategies and service provision, and the offerings of investee organisations. 
The nature of policy environments and the scale of procurement markets had a key bearing 
on the success of investees. Across the five areas of public service delivery organisations 
operated in, least progress was in the fields of community cohesion (one per cent of contract 
value), children and young people (six per cent of contract value) and crime (ten per cent of 
contract value). The procurement environments for education and learning (47 per cent of 
contract value) health and social care (36 per cent of the value of contracts) appeared far 
more favourable.  
Case study organisations successfully securing contracts appeared to have several enabling 
factors that arguably made them more likely to succeed in securing contracts: 
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 the services offered were central to mainstream policy agendas and public policy 
budgets  services were closely aligned with local authority priorities, strategies and service 
provision  demand for services outstripped supply  there were established relationships between commissioners and case organisations, 
often spanning local and national levels. 
The case studies included third sector organisations operating at local and national levels, 
some focused solely on one local authority area, some with a goal to operate beyond a 
single local authority area, and national organisations serving both multiple localities and 
national commissioning bodies. The local organisations seeking to expand out of a single 
local authority customer base were on the whole the least successful, suggesting that their 
previous success had been contingent on a set of local relational factors.  
An important finding was that whilst investee organisations had viable proposals at the point 
of investment, many were hampered by changes in the public procurement environment, or 
conversely a lack of progress to change. A rationale of Futurebuilders set out in the 
Treasury's Cross Cutting Review (HM Treasury 2002) was that, alongside the programme, 
there would be far-reaching changes to the procurement and commissioning of public 
services. This would require new policies across government and, critically, implementation 
at a local level. The key barrier for many investments had either been due to insufficient 
progress being made at a local level in implementing national policy reforms to procurement 
and commissioning practice (for instance in the health and social care area) or subsequent 
changes to national policy agendas which rendered the original rationales for investment 
obsolete. This is a lesson for social investment policy in the future and a wider reflection on 
the limitations of joined-up government (Clark 2002). 
 
Change for Service Users  
Change for service users was understood to be the outcomes that are net benefits brought 
by investments for individuals, groups and areas. Futurebuilders funding typically developed 
the capacity for services to be delivered; it did not directly fund the services which brought 
outcomes for service users. Table 5 describes the outcomes sought by each of the case 
study investments.  
 
Table 5: Scope of Outcomes Sought in the Case Studies 
 Activity Outcomes Sought 
 Crime 
A Work-based support provided 
to ex-offenders 
- Reductions in re-offending 
- Reductions in local crime rates 
- Increases in employment rates 
B Stabilisation of drug users - Increase in employment rates 
- Reduction in drug dependency 
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- Reductions in crime 
M Prison based education 
programmes 
- Reductions in re-offending  
- Improved health outcomes 
 Education and Learning 
C Support to refugees - Improvements in health 
- Increases in employment rates 
- Improved quality of life 
D Support to children with a 
lifelong limiting condition 
- Increase education performance 
- Improved wellbeing 
- Wider acceptance of disability 
L Education and inclusion 
through the arts for 
disadvantaged people 
- Improved quality of life 
 Health and Social Care 
E Mental health support - Increased quality of life of patients 
- Savings in GP time 
- Savings in prescription costs 
F Sheltered accommodation and 
support for older people 
- Increased quality of life for older people 
- Increase in life expectancy 
I Health and social care project - Improved health outcomes for service users and their families 
- Reduction in drug use 
- Reduction in experience of violence 
- Reduction in offending 
J Support facility for people with 
learning disabilities 
- Service users gain employment 
- Improved health outcomes 
O Support for people with 
physical and sensory 
disabilities 
- Improved quality of life 
- Improved community involvement 
- Reduction of social isolation 
- Increased access to opportunities for learning, training and 
development 
Q Social care accommodation for 
people with complex needs 
- Improved quality of life 
- Increased independent living 
 Children and Young People 
G Children's centre - Increases of life choices of young people 
- Increase in employment of parents 
- Benefits to other childcare centres in area from learning 
- Safeguarding rural primary school 
N Counselling for young people - Improved mental health outcomes 
 Community Cohesion 
H Community cohesion projects - Reductions in racial tension 
- Increase in cultural awareness and tolerance of cultural 
differences 
- Increase in social responsibility and citizenship 
K Housing focused community 
reconciliation 
- Reduced anti social behaviour 
- Reduced homelessness 
- Improved health outcomes 
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P Community development and 
inclusion for hard to reach 
communities 
- Improved levels of service user employment 
- Improved access to education 
- Reduce crime 
Source: Futurebuilders Assessment Documentation 
At the investment decision stage, Futurebuilders made an assessment of the potential 
outcomes from the investment, however indirect this relationship was. Investment milestones 
however were based on outputs (buildings completed, numbers of service users) and not in 
terms of measuring change to individuals. It was also found that few case organisations had 
the resources to undertake much more than rudimentary output monitoring. The exceptions 
here were larger organisations typically working at a national level: for this group the wider 
demonstration of outcomes was an essential part of maintaining their reputation, and often a 
national influencing role.  
Given the timescales required to realise many of the investments, the outputs, let alone 
outcomes, may take many years to be realised. In nine out of 17 case study organisations, 
insufficient evidence was collected on outcomes. In a further two cases, one organisation 
had effectively ceased operation (resulting in no outcomes achieved) and another was still to 
deliver services. In the remaining six cases it was possible to find a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative evidence to demonstrate outcomes.  
Attribution of outcome change to Futurebuilders was difficult and indirect because the direct 
benefits of Futurebuilders lie primarily in terms of organisational development and in the 
delivery of public services. Social outcomes for service users are indirect, being purchased 
by public sector organisations or by individuals (in the case of childcare provision and elder 
care). As such, Futurebuilders investments may have catalytic effects and may bring 
benefits which would otherwise have not occurred, or not occurred to the same extent. 
Identification and attribution of outcomes was also compounded because:  
 Futurebuilders investments were made alongside other funding 
 outcomes may be in the long term (for example in the case of support to children, where 
outcomes are not realised to adulthood) 
 outcomes are difficult to attribute solely to one organisation (for example a complex 
intervention for the treatment of drug addiction which works across agencies) 
Variable practice in the capture and monitoring of service benefits for users was also found. 
This ranged from organisations which had exemplary monitoring systems and extensive 
research programmes into the outcomes of supported individuals, to far more limited 
monitoring and evaluation systems. In part this reflects the scale and scope of the 
organisations concerned.  
Finally, debates around social investment have gone hand-in-hand with approaches to 
measuring social impact, with the emergent methodology of social return on investment 
garnering considerable policy attention in the UK (Cabinet Office 2009). The findings 
presented here at the very least indicate problems with attributing outcome change to loans; 
their benefit is largely around allowing activities to be brought forward in time, rather than as 
directly attributable benefits.  
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Discussion 
Futurebuilders was announced in 2002, launched in 2004 and closed for new applicants in 
2010. Eight years is a long time in contemporary public policy, and perhaps more so in an 
emergent field such as social investment. Notably, the commitment and then disbursement 
of the Futurebuilders fund was slower than anticipated; most investments were made from 
2008-10. This reflects a variety of factors, including the time taken to progress the opening 
up of procurement to the third sector, notably at a local level; the availability of other funding 
and especially grants during much of this period; and some risk aversion by third sector 
organisations to taking on loans. More broadly, and as the findings here suggest, the fund 
may have been committed sooner had there been better targeting of segments of the third 
sector, rather than a more general sector-wide approach.  
Across the three areas examined, positive change was both modest and variable. Many 
investments had struggled, the likelihood of default on loans is probably high and with this is 
the prospect of bad debt. At the time the evaluation was completed, the level of default for 
the entire Futurebuilders investment book was low at only 3.3 per cent, although many 
investments were still at a very early stage. The full evaluation (Wells et al 2010) also found 
positive findings around investment selection: Futurebuilders appeared to be selecting 
organisations with the capacity to grow strongly compared to rejected organisations or the 
wider third sector.  
The evaluation was undertaken prior to significant public expenditure cuts announced in the 
UK Government's 2010 Emergency Budget and subsequent Spending Review. The 
environment for many investee organisations will be difficult as a result, although clearly 
there will be differential effects: some organisations may be well placed to attract new 
opportunities, others far less so and be operating in areas which are no longer public policy 
priorities.  
This raises the question as to whether social investment warrants policy attention. The 
Futurebuilders evaluation suggests that the success of the programme is at best mixed. 
Futurebuilders was a particular model of social investment, tied closely to wider government 
objectives around public service delivery. There are other models which include regulation 
(for example the Community Reinvestment Act in the US), a simpler institutional approach to 
establish a new bank (such as Big Society Capital in the UK), specialisation at a particular 
spatial scale, specialisation by sector, or through smaller scale initiatives (such as 
community development finance institutions). In this respect Futurebuilders was emblematic 
of New Labour in its interest in social investment and the third sector, but more importantly in 
its attempts to join up complex policy agendas (Clark 2002).  
Futurebuilders was a large third sector programme, although in comparison to the 
government's ChangeUp initiative (concerned with infrastructure support to the full array of 
third sector organisations), Futurebuilders was far more focused. Out of 171,000 charities 
(Clark et al 2010) in the UK, it made loans to 215 organisations. A total of 745 organisations 
prepared business plans for funding (although probably in excess of 2,000 organisations 
enquired about funding or made outline applications). A more appropriate approach may 
have been to establish Futurebuilders as a pilot or perhaps a set of pilots. 
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Both Futurebuilders and the more recent proposals for social investment (HM Government 
2011) stress the importance of cultural and behavioural change in the sector, in particular 
around the desire to create a more enterprising and business-like sector. Moreover, there is 
a concern that third sector organisations are 'grant dependent' (Macmillan 2007) and that 
loan finance in some form will drive the desired change and bring the perceived benefits of 
loan capital. The evidence from Futurebuilders is that loan finance is not a simple panacea, 
nor does it necessarily correct all the perceived problems in the sector. There is an 
assumption that innovative, dynamic organisations generating considerable social benefits 
for the most disadvantaged will be at the front of the queue for social investment. The 
evidence from Futurebuilders is that this is not the case. Markets, including those for social 
investment, are beset with imperfections and 'market failures' which cannot be easily 
addressed. Critical here is the capacity to capture, quantify and 'monetise' social returns or 
societal benefits in a way that gives clear signals to social investors. The findings from 
Futurebuilders suggest that, despite considerable policy attention, the measurement of 
outcomes is incredibly difficult for many third sector organisations. Moreover, this 
undermines the notion that it is realistic to expect monetised indicators of social impact to 
correct a market failure (HM Government 2011; Zerbe and McCurdy 1999) 
The Futurebuilders evaluation suggests that it was relatively successful in supporting a set of 
organisations to increase their capacity to deliver public services. These organisations were 
already strong in terms of their income growth. However, increasing capacity is not the same 
as securing income, delivering contracts and achieving a social impact. The results about 
contracts secured suggest that performance was far more uneven - a relatively small group 
of organisations secured the majority of contracts.  
 
Conclusion: prospects for social investment policy 
The use of social investment dates from the mid-1990s (Giddens 1998) and in particular the 
political economy of welfare. Its second meaning, around the provision of finance for social 
welfare outcomes, emanates from the mid-2000s, although there are widespread 
international prototypical examples of social investment practice from earlier activities 
(Okagaki and Moy 2001). Moreover, it is only in the last few years that the use of the term in 
relation to finance has gained currency (Nicholls 2010). Its clearest articulation by national 
policy makers is the publication of the UK Coalition Government's green paper Growing the 
Social Investment Market (HM Government 2011). Social investment debate has clearly 
shifted, with notable differences between the New Labour government's approach and 
emphasis on the third sector as a deliverer of public services on behalf of the state, and the 
Coalition government's emphasis on a more independent third sector accessing finance in a 
social investment market. The preface to the UK green paper on social investment is 
revealing in this respect, as its two ministerial proponents in government highlight: 
"… this is not about handouts - it is about encouraging a new, self-sustaining market 
to grow, free of state interference … Change in this market will not take place 
overnight, but it will be transformative in allowing social ventures to scale up and take 
on new challenges. We will do all we can to make it happen" (Maude and Hurd 2011). 
Foreword to Growing the Social Investment Market (HM Government 2011). 
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In conclusion it is possible to reflect briefly on some of the underpinning arguments 
advanced in support of social investment.  
The first argument is that social investment provides a future blueprint for restructuring 
welfare provision, akin to proposals by Giddens in the 1990s but advanced most strongly by 
proposals to dramatically transform and/or reduce the role of the state. The suggestion here 
is that a market for welfare provision will be created in which a complex of agendas are 
married: the efficiency of private sector delivery (Chapman et al 2008; Blank 2000; HM 
Government 2011), the reach and innovation of the third sector (Billis and Harris 1996; HM 
Treasury 2002), and the currency of returns on investment for social outcomes (Arvidson et 
al 2010; Nicholls 2009). The evidence from Futurebuilders points to some very pragmatic 
problems with these logics. The most notable, and the one pointed to by Pharoah (Pharoah 
2011), is that the choices of private individuals, institutions and by extension social investors 
are often at odds with the requirements of the state and society for welfare. Even where the 
state is able to set the remit for a social investor, as is the case in Futurebuilders, it is far 
from clear whether capacity was developed to best meet social needs. Indeed, it is arguable 
that the Futurebuilders' investments which struggled the most were those working in the 
most challenging areas in terms of the complexity and severity of social needs.  
The second argument is that social investment will be a success only if a series of market 
failures are corrected. This is the central position of the HM Government Social Investment 
green paper and is a common normative position for government intervention (Zerbe and 
McCurdy 1999). The most relevant market failures concern the asymmetric information 
(between lenders and borrowers), more generally imperfect information (in particular about 
common measures of returns) and transaction costs (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Zerbe and 
McCurdy 1999). The concern here is that the effect of these market failures leads to an 
under-capitalised third sector (Haugh and Kitson 2007; HM Government 2011; SQW 2007). 
These issues are worthy of further empirical exploration. This paper suggests that the issue 
of under-capitalisation is not simply one of a lack of finance. The findings point very strongly 
to the need to fully understand organisational and contextual factors as reasons for 
investment performance. This may prompt not the further provision of capital, but instead the 
provision of advice and support or wider changes to the operation of local procurement 
markets. The common concern with the market failure thesis in social investment is about 
asymmetric information and the attendant risks of moral hazard and adverse selection 
(Zerbe and McCurdy 1999; Rhodes 2010). In these areas Futurebuilders provides a model 
of how these issues may be addressed, but critically not without significant transaction costs 
(for organisational support) that a private investor would probably not bear. The implication is 
that the use of standardised measures of social impact, whilst seeking to address these 
issues, are likely to have differential effects across the third sector and probably different 
areas of social policy. The reasons are twofold and concern the costs associated and the 
virtual impossibility of reducing some outcomes to simple monetised measures.  
The third argument is that social investment will lead to behavioural change on the part of 
the third sector. Such behavioural change is intended to include overcoming a lack of 
business skills but more broadly to address risk aversion where success would be 
manifested through shifting financing away from grants. Futurebuilders sought to address 
these barriers by combining loan financing, to realise a new project or to expand a particular 
area, with advice and grant support aimed at remedying organisational weakness. The 
evaluation found that some weaknesses could be easily resolved often in larger 
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organisations with already well developed organisational forms; however, the demands of 
realising often complex investments which required organisations to grow substantially (often 
several fold) could not be addressed simply with small grants or advice. Whilst the social 
investor, Futurebuilders, correctly identified the problem, this was no guarantee of success. 
More broadly, since the mid 2000s there has been a shift in the discourse of third sector 
funding. On the one hand a growing policy discourse has sought to problematise grants 
whilst highlighting the virtues of investment. But on the other hand, as Macmillan (2007) 
highlights, in response to contributors such as Unwin and Carrington (Unwin 2004; 
Carrington (2005) who have advocated a greater use of non-grant funding as part of building 
a stronger third sector: 'to date no references have been found which provide research 
evidence of the existence of "grant dependency"' (Macmillan 2007 p. 34). The findings from 
the Futurebuilders evaluation suggest that grants, contract income and loan finance are not 
substitutes but rather have separate, distinct and necessary purposes.  
A final concern rests with issues of risk, expectation and public sector funding. Many 
Futurebuilders investments were made prior to the financial crisis of 2008 and all were made 
prior to the austerity package or deficit reduction programme of the UK Coalition 
Government from 2010. Many investees probably made decisions on the basis of an 
anticipated steady state in public finance. This is no longer the case and suggests that the 
overall effects of the Futurebuilders social investment policy experiment will only be fully 
revealed in the long term. 
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i
 Throughout this paper the term Futurebuilders is used to mean both the policy initiative and the 
organisation managing the fund (in full, Futurebuilders England Ltd). 
ii
 The National Offender Management System is the UK Government approach to commissioning 
adult offender custodial and probation services in England and Wales. Although formally established 
in 2004 it was not full rolled out until 2008.  
